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1. Introduction
It is well-known that self-selection in education gives rise to composition eﬀects in the
distribution of skills across education groups. Namely, self-selection implies that the
characteristics of the agents who educate generally diﬀer from the characteristics of those
who do not. In a competitive labour market, such composition eﬀects shape within and
between-group wage dispersion. However, they do not alter the eﬃciency of educational
choices. This property does not hold in a frictional labour market, where composition
eﬀects may distort the incentives to schooling. In a model where agents only diﬀer with
respect to labour market ability, Charlot and Decreuse (2005) show that self-selection
in education is ineﬃcient, and too many workers are willing to acquire education. The
purpose of the present paper is to reconsider their result in the realistic case where agents
not only diﬀer in labour market ability, but also in schooling cost. Our main conclu-
sion is that provided ability and schooling cost are not too positively correlated, agents
with large schooling costs — the ‘poor’ — select themselves too much, while there is too
little self-selection among the low schooling cost individuals — the ‘rich’. We also study
the combination of labour market and education policy that decentralizes the eﬃcient
allocation. There, we suggest that education should be more taxed than subsidized.
Our model is based on three main features. First, there is worker-job heterogeneity.
There are two schooling levels, educated/uneducated, and two production sectors, one for
the high-skill (complex) jobs, and the other for the low-skill (simple) jobs. There are two
sources of heterogeneity among workers : ability and schooling costs. This assumption is
the major departure from our previous contribution (Charlot and Decreuse, 2005). We
shall refer to agents endowed with low schooling costs as the ‘rich’, and to those with
high schooling costs as the ‘poor’1. Second, we consider a frictional labour market. The
number of contacts between employers and job-seekers is driven by a constant returns to
scale matching technology. The search market is fully segmented by education/technology,
but not by ability: only the educated can do the high-skill jobs, and firms target their
high-skill positions towards the educated. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining, and
sectorial job creation is endogenized by means of a free entry condition. Free entry implies
sectorial job creation depends on the composition of education groups. Third, there is
self-selection in education. Agents face a binary schooling choice, i.e. being educated
or uneducated, and select themselves on the basis of their private costs and returns to
schooling. Only those whose ability is suﬃciently high and/or whose schooling cost is
suﬃciently low choose to invest in education. At individual level, self-selection depends
on market factors, as productivity diﬀerences2 and unemployment rate diﬀerences across
1This is of course a short-cut as we consider a non-degenerate joint distribution of characteristics.
2As in Roy’s (1951) model of job assignment.
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sectors3.
In a frictionless (walrasian) environment, a worker’s return to education depends on her
own innate characteristics and on sectorial productivity diﬀerences, but it is not altered
by the composition of education groups. Educational choices are therefore eﬃcient. In
a frictional economy, the composition of education groups alters wage and employment
opportunities, and, in turn, self-selection is driven by sectorial wage and employment
diﬀerences. As a result, educational choices are generally ineﬃcient.
Namely, wage and employment opportunities depend on the intensity of job creation,
and under free entry, job creation in each sector depends on the average labour mar-
ket ability across the pool of job-seekers4. Anyone whose ability is above (below) the
sector-specific mean ability generates a positive (negative) sector-specific externality by
boosting (reducing) job creation, and therefore driving wage and employment opportuni-
ties upwards (downwards). Hence, high-ability individuals under-estimate the return to
schooling, while the less able over-estimate it. Provided that schooling cost and ability
are not too positively correlated, agents who face large schooling costs — the poor — select
themselves too much, while those who face small schooling costs — the rich — select them-
selves too little. Hence, search frictions provide a rationale to the following claim: there
are too many rich investing in education, which depreciates the return to schooling, and
crowds out poorer and abler individuals from schooling.
Incidentally, congestion externalities may alter this general reasoning, so that over-
education may prevail at all schooling costs. Assume individuals only diﬀer in their
schooling costs. In this case, the private return to participation in a given sector is lower
than the social return unless the so-called Hosios condition — that is, workers’ bargaining
power must be equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the pool of
unemployed — holds. If the diﬀerence between private and social return to participation
is much smaller in the high-skill sector than in the low-skill one, then the private return
to schooling exceeds the social return.
Finally, we turn to education policy. We assume the planner only observes individual
schooling costs, and not ability. Eﬃciency requires that some of the high ability indi-
viduals with high schooling costs must be attracted in education, while some of the low
ability individuals with low schooling costs must be deterred from education. This can
be done with two instruments: a subsidy increasing in schooling costs, combined with
3This is a straightforward consequence of the incorporation of search frictions in a Roy-type economy.
4This latter property is due to rent-sharing, which implies that the profitability of a filled job raises
with the worker’s ability. There is considerable empirical evidence showing that wages are positively
correlated with profitability. For instance, using a matched panel to control for worker as well as firm
heterogeneity, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) demonstrate that high skill workers are paid more
and that profitability is higher for firms with more skilled workers.
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a lump-sum tuition cost. The optimal policy is therefore redistributive, as the ‘poor’
are more subsidized than they are taxed while the ‘rich’ are more taxed than subsidized.
Given that, a natural question is thus: should education be taxed more than it should
be subsidized? We answer this question in the particular case where the Hosios condition
holds. Then, education must be taxed more than subsidized. The positive externalities
induced by educational choices are more than outweighed by the negative externalities in
this setting.
Our analysis is based on the existence of composition externalities induced by self-
selection in education. Sorting models of education (such as those surveyed in Fernandez,
2001) also provide a number of examples where the composition of education groups mat-
ters for eﬃciency, though for diﬀerent reasons. At the family level, there can be marital
sorting influencing the way in which human capital and other abilities are intergenera-
tionally transmitted. In the schooling system, there can be some peer eﬀects involved.
At production level, there are some complementarities between workers of diﬀerent skill
levels which may not be internalized within firms. In the city, the composition of the
neighbourhood induces some important externalities through taxation and the provision
of schooling. Closest to us, Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) build a model in which
agents also diﬀer in ability and schooling cost (“nonwage income” in their terminology).
Beyond the access to high-skill/best-paid positions, education also provides the workers
with social status. In their view, the demand for social status increases with the aver-
age ability of the high-skill workers. This entails a composition externality, so that the
“wrong” individuals may be led to acquire schooling . In this perspective, the novelty of
our paper is to exhibit a diﬀerent yet realistic channel through which composition eﬀects
can be held responsible for the crowding-out from schooling of the poor by the rich.
The search literature emphasizes other reasons for ineﬃcient educational investments.
Acemoglu (1996) shows that rent sharing may translate into a hold-up problem for the
workers. In models where there is a unique search market for all skill levels, Laing,
Palivos and Wang (1995), and Burdett and Smith (2002) demonstrate that there are
social increasing returns to schooling. This externality does not arise in our paper as the
search market is segmented by education. There are also papers in this field highlighting
overeducation as a potential outcome. In Snower (1995) and Saint-Paul (1996), there
may be some excess supply of skills as a rise in the number of educated alters firms’
incentives to allocate their vacancies between sectors. Moen (1999) considers a model
where investing in education improves one’s ranking in the job queue, but at the expense
of the others. In the multi-dimensional skill model of Charlot, Decreuse and Granier
(2005), workers invest in education to improve their chance of being employed, but also
to raise their outside opportunities during the wage bargain.
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Our paper highlights a case of ‘market adverse selection’. As the return to participation
in each sector depends on sector-specific mean ability, all the agents tend to be attracted
by the sector where the mean ability is the highest. At the market level, the ablest
workers provide their less talented co-workers with wage and employment subsidies5. This
situation occurs mainly because the market is segmented by education levels and not by
ability. To appreciate the restrictiveness of such assumptions, it is worth investigating
two polar cases.
On the one hand, the search market may be totally unsegmented. An externality
similar to that highlighted by Burdett and Smith (2002) would then be at work. Increasing
the share of educated individuals would raise the probability of meeting such workers;
high-skill vacancies would then become more profitable for this reason; this would boost
job creation. Such an externality would lead to under-education. In our paper, the search
market is segmented by job type, as the uneducated cannot perform on the high skill jobs
— a technological restriction. The above mentioned externality cannot arise, because each
worker who gets an education also gets the right to participate to the market for high
skill jobs.
On the other hand, the search market may be fully segmented, that is both by schooling
level and by ability. The composition of education groups does not alter the schooling
return in such a case, as individuals are homogenous within each cell of the search market.
Of course, this is no longer the case in our contribution, because the low ability workers
benefit from the presence of abler individuals in their market segment. Full segmentation is
not a stable outcome in our setting, because of the adverse selection phenomena discussed
above. Low ability workers have incentives to participate to the market segments where
wage and employment opportunities are expected to be better6.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic setup. Section 3 studies
the properties of the walrasian environment, whereas section 4 considers a frictional labour
market. Section 5 deals with the design of the eﬃcient policy. Section 6 concludes.
5In signalling models (see Arrow, 1973, and Spence, 1973), high ability workers also provide a wage
subsidy to low ability workers, but at the firm level. In our paper, firms perfectly observe individual
characteristics at the recruitment stage, and could reject an application to wait for a better match. In
this perspective, the ineﬃciency of the decentralized allocation is due to employers’ failure at the sector
level to coordinate on the rejection of low ability workers’ applications. Of course, this depends on the
organization of the search market as we argue below.
6This is also due to the way wages are set in our paper, i.e. to rent-sharing. In the two ability level
matching model of Inderst (2005), firms set wages and make them contingent on workers’ ability. Then
the search market partitions into two market segments. Our paper adopts the view that such contracts
are not enforceable, either because ability is not observable (or at least not verifiable) by a court, or
because workers have some market power. In the former case, Inderst shows that the search market is
no longer segmented (see also the model of Lang and Manove, 2003, with continuous types).
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2. The model
2.1. Environment
Time is continuous. At each instant, δ > 0 agents are born. This ensures new cohorts
enter the population and make their education decision at each instant. Agents are risk
neutral, discount time at rate ρ, and have a constant risk of dying (retirement) δ > 0.
Hence, the eﬀective rate of discount is r ≡ ρ+ δ, and the global population is normalized
to 1.
Heterogeneity and education. There are two schooling levels: educated/uneducated.
Agents are heterogenous with respect to two innate characteristics: schooling cost c and
labour market ability a (ability, for short). Those who pay the schooling cost get an
education; those who do not remain uneducated. Heterogenous schooling costs may either
reflect the existence of credit constraints, or diﬀerent aptitudes to learn at school. Though
we are aware these two interpretations may actually lead to drastically diﬀerent policy
recommendations, it is important at this stage to notice our results are derived under the
assumption private and social schooling costs coincide. The externalities we point out
are therefore independent of the standard market failure originating from credit market
imperfections7. In the same way, heterogenous abilities may be attributed to diﬀerent
innate productive capacities, as well as to diﬀerent social backgrounds. Schooling costs
and ability are distributed across individuals within cohorts according to the stationary
joint distribution φ : R+ → R+.
Assumption 1 (i) The function φ is positive and continuous over R+ ×R+
(ii) E (a) =
R
c
R
a φ (a, c) adadc < +∞
We shall impose additional constraints later on, while examining the market and
centralized outcomes in the frictional environment.
Production technologies. There are two sectors producing a single final good: a high-
skill, high productivity sector where complex tasks are performed and a low-skill, low
productivity sector where simple tasks are performed. Sectors are indexed by i = h, l,
where h refers to the high-skill sector, and l to the low-skill sector. Only the educated
workers can do the high-skill jobs. In each sector, there is an endogenous mass of firms
all endowed with a single job, which can be either vacant, or filled. As in the standard
model (see Pissarides, 2000), holding a vacancy involves a flow cost γ > 0.
7In section 5 where we deal with policy issues, it is explicitly assumed that there are no credit con-
straints.
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Output depends on firm’s and worker’s characteristics. Denoting by yia the output of
a type a worker in a sector i job, we have
yia = Aia (2.1)
where Ai is a sector-specific productivity parameter, Ah > Al > 0. Complex jobs are thus
more productive than simple jobs. This implies education has a productive role: it allows
the workers to perform on more complex and more productive technologies. Note there is
no peer-eﬀect at the production stage: the ability of other workers does not aﬀect one’s
productivity.
Matching sector. The search market is segmented by sector. Each individual is allowed
to participate to either one of the two sectors, but not to both. In each sector, unem-
ployed and vacancies are brought together by pair according to a constant-returns to scale
(CRS) matching technology. The flow of (sectorial) matchesMi between unemployed and
vacancies is given by:
Mi ≡ m0M (ui, vi) (2.2)
with m0 > 0 a scale parameter reflecting the magnitude of search frictions. Matching
is random: matches are equiprobably distributed between unemployed — irrespective of
ability — as well as between vacancies. Due to CRS, the flow probability of a worker
to match a vacancy µi and the flow probability of a vacancy to match a worker ηi only
depend on the ratio of vacancies to job-seekers, the so-called market tightness θi ≡ vi/ui.
Hence, µi ≡ m0Mi/ui = µ (θi), and ηi ≡ m0Mi/vi = µ (θi) /θi.
Assumption 2 The function µ is strictly increasing, satisfies the boundary conditions
µ (0) = 0 and lim
θ→∞
µ (θ) = ∞, and the Inada conditions lim
θ→0
µ0 (θ) = ∞, and
lim
θ→0
µ (θ) =∞
These standard properties imply the function η is strictly decreasing from infinity to
0.
Flows and stocks. Let Ωit, i = h, l, e denotes the sub-set of R+ × R+ that induces,
respectively, the choice of schooling (and, therefore, of participating to the high-skill sec-
tor), participating to the low-skill sector, and non-participating at time t. Since schooling
is costly, non-participating workers do not get an education and the intersection of the
various subsets taken by pairs is empty, that is Ωit ∩ Ωjt = ∅ for i 6= j. In addition,
∪iΩit = Ω.
The size of the labour force ni on sector i = h, l evolves according to
dni/dt = δ
Z Z
Ωit
φ (a, c) dcda− δni (2.3)
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The only source of separation is the workers’ death (retirement). The rate of unem-
ployment ui and the mass-numbers of employees li in sector i obey the following law of
motion:
dui/dt =
δ
R R
Ωit
φ (a, c) dcda
ni
− (µi + δ)ui (2.4)
li = ni (1− ui) (2.5)
Entrants make up the inflow into unemployment in each sector, while the outflow is equal
to the sum of hires and the number of deaths. In steady-state, Ωit = Ωi for all t and
dni/dt = dui/dt = 0. It follows that
ni =
Z Z
Ωi
φ (a, c) dcda (2.6)
ui =
δ
µi + δ
(2.7)
li =
µi
µi + δ
ni (2.8)
Aggregate output in sector i is worth
Yi = Ailiai (2.9)
where
ai ≡ E [a | (a, c) ∈ Ωi] (2.10)
is the average ability among workers in sector i.
Aggregate schooling cost is
C ≡ δ
Z Z
Ωh
φ (a, c) cdcda (2.11)
2.2. Decentralized economy
Agents’ gains. In the decentralized economy, the allocation of workers between sectors
is driven by self-selection in education, while sectorial job creation depends on firms’
incentives to enter the search market. In sum, the assignment of workers to sectors
depends on private gains expected by firms and workers. We assume as it is common
in the literature that the size of rents accruing to each party when a match occurs is
determined by ex-post Nash bargaining.
Let Uia and Wia be the respective values of being unemployed and employed in sector
i for a type a worker. Let also Vi and Jia denote the values of a sector i-vacant job and
of a sector i-filled job with a similar worker.
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Denoting the wage rate by wia, these values satisfy the arbitrage equations:
rUia = µi [Wia − Uia] (2.12)
rWia = wia (2.13)
rJia = yia − wia + δVi (2.14)
ρVi = −γ + ηi [E (Jia | (a, c) ∈ Ωi)− Vi] (2.15)
As it is standard, each value can be considered an asset value. The return to the asset is
equal to the flow benefit (or loss), plus the expected gain (loss) resulting from a potential
change of state. Equation (2.15) deserves additional comments. Randommatching in each
sector implies the type a of the incoming worker is a priori unknown to the employer. This
justifies the conditional mean operator E.
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining:
β [Jia − Vi] = (1− β) [Wia − Uia] (2.16)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s exogenous bargaining power.
Schooling, non-participation and tightness. We present how (i) non-participation, (ii)
self-selection in education and (iii) sector-specific market tightness are determined.
(i) Non-participants get a negative return from their participation to each sector.
Formally, an agent endowed with ability a and schooling cost c does not participate to
the labour market if and only if
max hUla, Uha − ci < 0 (2.17)
(ii) Each agent compares her utility if she decided to get an education (net of the schooling
cost) to that she would get if she decided to remain uneducated. Therefore, an agent
endowed with ability a and schooling cost c becomes educated if and only if
Uha − c ≥ max hUla, 0i (2.18)
(iii) Firms enter the search market until the exhaustion of all rents. Free entry implies
V vi ≤ 0 (2.19)
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the case where ρ tends to 0. This assumption is usual
in the search literature and does not seem particularly restrictive. It provides a simple
rationale for the reason why we only focus on steady states.
9
2.3. Centralized economy
In the centralized economy, a social planner chooses the number of vacancies in each
sector as well as the assignment of workers to sectors — the allocation of talents. The
planner takes the joint distribution of schooling cost and ability as given8 and maximizes
the discounted path of aggregate consumption. When the rate of time preference ρ tends
to 0, we have:
S = max
Ωi,vi
*X
i
(Yi − γvi)− C
+
(2.20)
This is the sum of sector-specific output net of search costs, minus aggregate schooling
costs. Using the definitions above, and taking account of the fact that vi = θiui, we get
S = max
Ωi,θi
*X
i=h,l
Z Z
Ωi
φ (a, c) (1− ui)
∙
Aia− δ
γ
η (θi)
¸
dcda− δ
Z Z
Ωh
φ (a, c) cdcda
+
(2.21)
subject to ui = δ/ (δ + µ (θi)), Ωi ⊂ R+×R+, Ωi∩Ωj = ∅ for all i 6= j, and ∪iΩi = R+×R+.
As a first step, we turn to the frictionless environment.
3. Walrasian allocation
In this section, we analyse the properties of the walrasian economy. A walrasian environ-
ment is taken here to be an environment where frictions are negligible. It is thus assumed
that the scale parameter of the matching technology m0 tends to infinity. We show the
assignment of workers to jobs through self-selection in education is socially eﬃcient.
3.1. Decentralized economy
When m0 tends to infinity, the value of search tends to the value of employment. From
the Nash bargaining equation (2.16), the value of a filled job for the firm tends to 0.
Consequently, the wage is equal to the output flow:
wia = yia (3.1)
As yia ≥ 0, all agents participate to the labour market and Ω∗e = ∅. Self-selection in
education is given by (2.18), which can be written as
(a, c) ∈ Ω∗h iﬀ Aha/δ ≥ Ala/δ + c (3.2)
8The planner could actually alter the schooling costs. For instance, if heterogenous schooling costs
resulted from credit constraints, the planner could reduce aggregate schooling costs simply by reallocating
financial resources among agents. This standard market failure is not taken into account here.
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From this equation, we can draw an indiﬀerence locus in the (a, c) plane, that is the set
of characteristics of agents indiﬀerent between acquiring higher education or remaining
lowly educated:
c = R∗a (3.3)
where R∗ ≡ (Ah −Al) /δ is the return to schooling, that is the diﬀerential return to ability
in the high and low productivity sectors. It is increasing in the productivity diﬀerential
Ah −Al, and it is independent of the workers’ ability. Figure 3.1 depicts the assignment
of agents to sectors. Individuals whose characteristics are below the indiﬀerence locus
get an education. Conversely, those whose characteristics are above the locus remain
uneducated.
There are uneducated workers as far as there exist individuals with low ability and
high schooling costs. There are also educated workers since some high ability individuals
are endowed with low schooling costs. Agents may decide not to invest in education
either because the cost of their schooling is too high (despite potentially large ability
levels), or because their ability is too poor (despite low schooling costs). Note that in
the absence of any restrictions on the joint distribution of schooling costs and ability, the
mean ability among the educated may well be higher or lower than the mean ability among
the uneducated. But this has no consequences on individual choices: in the frictionless
economy, a worker’s return to schooling does not depend on the composition of education
groups. Crucially, this property does not hold in the frictional environment.
This mechanism of self-selection refers to Roy (1951), where a continuum of (het-
erogenous) workers select themselves between a discrete number of occupations. Each
individual is characterized by a bundle of sector-specific skills, and chooses which sector
to enter on the basis of comparative advantage. In our model, there is a unique labour
market ability common to each sector9. This implies the returns to ability in the low-
and high-skill sectors are perfectly correlated. However, there is a cost of entry to the
high-skill sector which is assumed to diﬀer across the population. If one considers utilities
obtained in each case instead of abilities, that is Uh = Aha/δ − c and Ul = Ala/δ, then
Roy’s setup and ours are equivalent in terms of the payoﬀs the agents can expect.
3.2. Centralized economy
The social criterion is worth
S = max
Ωi
*X
i=h,l
Z Z
Ωi
φ (a, c)Aiadcda− δ
Z Z
Ωh
φ (a, c) cdcda
+
(3.4)
9Moscarini (2001) builds on and extends Roy’s setup to an environment with frictions, but does
not consider the normative implications of his model. The decentralized economy of our model and
Moscarini’s converge towards (formally) similar walrasian allocations as search frictions die down.
11
 a  
c  
lΩ  
hΩ  
Rac =  
Indifference 
line 
Figure 3.1: The allocation of talents in the walrasian economy. Agents whose characterit-
ics are below the line get educated, while the others remain uneducated.
In the absence of externality, the fact that yia ≥ 0 implies (like the decentralized economy)
Ωse = ∅. A type a worker gets an education if and only if her net contribution to the social
criterion is non-negative, that is
(a, c) ∈ Ωsh iﬀ Aha ≥ Ala+ δc (3.5)
It follows that the social return to schooling Rs = R∗ and Ω∗h = Ω
s
h. Consequently,
self-selection is socially eﬃcient.
The introduction of matching frictions dramatically alters this result, as we demon-
strate below.
4. Frictional environment
In this section, we show search frictions originate two important externalities implying the
private return diﬀers from the social return to schooling. On the one hand, self-selection
in education originates a composition externality that relates sector-specific wages and
employment opportunities to sector-specific mean ability. Due to this externality, poorly
able but rich individuals crowd out abler but poorer individuals from schooling. On
the other hand, ex-post Nash bargaining generally fails to internalize standard congestion
externalities. It follows the returns to each type of occupation are below the social returns.
As a consequence, there may be over-education at all schooling costs.
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4.1. Decentralized economy
A worker endowed with innate characteristic a working in sector i is paid a wage wia such
that
wia = β
δ + µi
δ + βµi
yia (4.1)
The wage equation (4.1) features standard properties: a worker gets a share β (δ + µi) / (δ + βµi)
of the output flow yia through the Nash bargain. This share increases with tightness and
bargaining power; it decreases with interest rate (see Pissarides, 2000). The wage is
also increasing with the output flow yia which raises the size of the surplus to be shared
between firms and workers. The value of search is then
Uia =
βµi
δ + βµi
yia
δ
(4.2)
Like in the walrasian case, yia ≥ 0 implies Uia ≥ 0, and therefore all agents are willing to
participate to the labour market in the decentralized outcome. Hence Ωe = ∅. According
to the self-selection rule (2.18), self-selection in education is now given by
(a, c) ∈ Ωh iﬀ
βµh
δ + βµh
Aha
δ
≥ βµl
δ + βµl
Ala
δ
+ c (4.3)
The main diﬀerence with the walrasian case is that the discounted value of output in each
sector is weighted by a term lower than one which reflects employment opportunities and
bargaining power in each sector — this term tends to one as µi tends to infinity.
As in the walrasian case, we can define the set of individuals indiﬀerent between being
educated or remaining uneducated:
c =
∙
βµh
δ + βµh
Ah
δ
− βµl
δ + βµl
Al
δ
¸
a (4.4)
Like the walrasian case, equation (4.4) defines a linear relationship between schooling cost
and ability. The slope of the curve is again the private return to schooling:
R ≡ βµh
δ + βµh
Ah
δ
− βµl
δ + βµl
Al
δ
(4.5)
It depends positively on the high-skill sector tightness, and negatively on the low-skill
sector tightness. Moreover, like the walrasian case, the private return to schooling does
not depend on ability.
Market tightness in each sector is determined by
γ
η (θi)
=
(1− β)Aiai
δ + βµ (θi)
(4.6)
The left-hand side is the mean search cost incurred by firms; the right-hand side is the
expected value of a filled job. As ηi is strictly decreasing in tightness, equation (4.6)
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implies tightness is an increasing function of average ability in each sector. The Beveridge
curve then implies that the unemployment rate in each sector is a decreasing function of
sector-specific average ability ai. Here is the key point of the paper: while comparing the
returns to being educated or uneducated, the agents do not take into account the eﬀect of
their choice on average ability in each sector. However, the average ability in each sector
determines wage and employment opportunities.
Proposition 1 A characterization of the decentralized allocation
There exists a vector (θ∗l , θ
∗
h, a
∗
l , a
∗
h, R
∗) satisfying the following conditions
(i) free entry
γ
η (θ∗i )
=
(1− β)Aia∗i
δ + βµ (θ∗i )
, i = h, l (4.7)
(ii) self-selection
a∗l = E [a | c > R∗a] and a∗h = E [a | c ≤ R∗a] (4.8)
(iii) return to schooling
R∗ =
βµ (θ∗h)
δ + βµ (θ∗h)
Ah
δ
− βµ (θ
∗
l )
δ + βµ (θ∗l )
Al
δ
(4.9)
where, by convention, E [a | c < 0] = 0.
Two diﬀerent configurations may arise. In the first, there is an interior equilibrium:
the return to schooling R∗ > 0 and the two sectors coexist. In the second, none gets an
education and the educated sector is closed.
Assumption 3 E (a | c ≤ ba− d) > E (a | a ≥ d/b) for all b > 0, d ≥ 0
Proposition 2 Existence of an interior equilibrium
There exists an interior equilibrium with a∗l < E (a) < a∗h
The result is established by mean of a fixed-point argument. According to (4.6),
tightness is an increasing function of sector-specific ability, i.e. θi ≡ Θi (ai). In turn,
the return to schooling R is an increasing function of θh, and a decreasing function of
θl. Together, these properties imply R ≡ < (Θh (ah) ,Θl (al)). Solving then reduces to
determine the fixed-point of
a∗l = E [a | c > < (Θh (a∗h) ,Θl (a∗l )) a] (4.10)
a∗h = E [a | c ≤ < (Θh (a∗h) ,Θl (a∗l )) a] (4.11)
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Like the walrasian case, the existence of low ability individuals with high schooling costs
guarantees some agents remain uneducated, that is Ω∗l 6= ∅. But unlike the walrasian case,
the fact that there are high ability individuals with low schooling costs does not ensure
some agents get an education. Indeed, as we mentioned above, self-selection does not
necessarily lead to a higher mean ability in the high-skill sector, especially when schooling
cost and ability are strongly positively correlated. In a frictional environment, ah < al
may imply the return to schooling is negative. In this case, no one gets an education
and there is no high-skill sector. This results from an adverse selection phenomenon
which takes place at the market level : high ability workers would be willing to get an
education, but if those workers decided to educate, this would also make the high-skill
sector attractive for low ability workers. This would deteriorate sector-specific tightness
by too much, implying the high ability workers would remain uneducated.
However, Assumption 3 avoids such a situation: as far as the return to schooling
is positive, the mean ability in the high-skill sector is higher than the unconditional
mean ability10. This also implies the mean ability in the low-skill sector is below the
unconditional mean ability. These properties in turn imply the return to schooling is
positive, which sustains the existence of at least one interior equilibrium.
Assumption 3 also reduces the scope for multiple equilibria. Consider for instance
the following multiplier eﬀect: as average ability in the high-skill sector increases, so does
firms’ incentives to create jobs in this sector, and as more jobs are created, it increases the
incentives for more people to get educated. If these marginal people are of the high-ability,
high-cost type, this may cause a further rise in the average ability in the high-skill sector,
thus perpetuating the process. Under Assumption 3, the increase in the proportion of
educated workers involves a decrease in the average ability of educated individuals.
4.2. Centralized economy
To describe the eﬃcient allocation, it is convenient to define the social return to ability
in sector i, P si , and the social return to schooling R
s as follows:
P si (a) = (1− ui)
∙
Aia
δ
− γ
ηi
¸
1
a
(4.12)
Rs (a) = P sh (a)− P sl (a) (4.13)
Sector-specific return to ability can be written as the employment rate 1− ui, times the
value of output net of the per employee recruitment cost, divided by ability. Importantly,
the contribution of each to output is increasing in ability, while corresponding recruitment
costs do not vary with ability. The social return to schooling is the diﬀerential return to
ability in each sector.
10Proposition 2 only requires that Assumption 3 holds for d = 0.
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The following characterization of the eﬃcient allocation is derived from the first-order
conditions to the maximization program (3.4) — see the proof of Proposition 3. The set
of non-participating agents is given by
(a, c) ∈ Ωse iﬀ P sl (a) < 0 and P sh (a) a < c (4.14)
Non-participants are those whose social return to participation is negative in the low-
skill sector, and lower than the schooling cost in the high-skill sector. For short, non-
participants have low ability that does yield suﬃcient output compared to the expected
search spending. Unlike the decentralized allocation, the eﬃcient allocation is character-
ized by a set of non-participating agents, that is Ωse 6= ∅.
The set of highly-educated agents is defined by
(a, c) ∈ Ωsh iﬀ P sh (a) ≥ 0 and Rs (a) a ≥ c (4.15)
Educated individuals are those whose return to ability in the high-skill sector is non-
negative, and the return to schooling times their ability is larger than the schooling cost.
Note the latter condition does not imply the former, as the return to participation in the
low-skill sector may be negative.
Finally, the amount of resources dedicated to search is given by
γ
η (θsi )
= αsi
Ai
δ + (1− αsi )µ (θsi )
asi , i = h, l (4.16)
where αsi ≡ θsiµ0 (θsi ) /µ (θsi ) and asi ≡ E [a | (a, c) ∈ Ωsi ]. Like the decentralized economy,
sector-specific tightness is increasing in sector-specific mean ability. In addition, we have
θsh > θ
s
l as long as a
s
h ≥ asl . However, this condition does not always hold.
Proposition 3 A characterization of the efficient allocation
There exists a vector (θsl , θ
s
h, a
s
l , a
s
h) and three functions P
s
h , P
s
l , R
s mapping R+ into R
such that
(i) tightness
γ
η (θsi )
= αsi
Ai
δ + (1− αsi )µ (θsi )
ai, i = h, l (4.17)
(ii) allocation of talents
asl = E [a | c > Rs (a) a, P sl (a) ≥ 0] and ash = E [a | c ≤ Rs (a) a, P sh (a) ≥ 0]
(4.18)
(iii) return to schooling
Rs (a) = P sh (a)− P sl (a) (4.19)
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(iv) return to participation in each sector
P si (a) =
(1− αsi )µ (θsi )
δ + (1− αsi )µ (θsi )
Ai
δ
+ usi
αsiµ (θ
s
i )
δ + (1− αsi )µ (θsi )
Ai
δ
a− ai
a
(4.20)
with αsi ≡ θsiµ0 (θsi ) /µ (θsi ), usi = δ/ (δ + µ (θsi )).
Proposition 3 synthesizes the allocation chosen by the central planner and, doing so,
states two important properties. First, the return to ability in each sector depends on
individual ability. It can be written as follows:
P si (a) = P
s
i (a
s
i ) + u
s
i
αsi
1− αsi
P si (a
s
i )
a− ai
a
(4.21)
The first term is sector-specific and denotes the individual contribution to aggregate
welfare at given sector-specific tightness. The second term is individual-specific and takes
into account the impact of the agent on sector-specific tightness through congestion eﬀects.
It depends on ability: it is negative (positive) for individuals whose ability is below
(above) the mean. Of course, it is nil when the workforce is homogenous. As the return
to schooling Rs (a) equals the diﬀerential return to ability, it is unclear whether it is
increasing in ability or not. The answer actually depends on the joint distribution of
schooling cost and ability.
Second, asi > 0 for i = h, l implies that, unlike the decentralized economy, there are
always uneducated and educated workers, i.e. Ωsi 6= ∅ for i = h, l. Even when the social
return to schooling is decreasing in ability, low ability agents are assigned to the high-skill
sector, while abler individuals are assigned to the low-skill sector. Why is this so? In the
decentralized economy, the return to schooling is the same for all individuals. When it
is positive, all agents are willing to get an education, but schooling costs prevent some
of them to do so. Conversely when it is negative, all agents remain uneducated. Despite
they are more productive in the high-skill sector, low ability agents realize they would
benefit from better job and wage opportunities in the low-skill sector. Indeed, the mean
ability is much higher in the latter sector, which in turn implies the corresponding search
market is tighter too. In the centralized economy, the social planner takes account of
the fact low ability individuals would deteriorate by too much the average ability among
the uneducated if assigned to this sector. Therefore, these workers are allocated to the
high-skill sector.
Proposition 4 asl < a
s
h if and only if
(i) Rs (a) and Rs (a) a are strictly increasing in a
(ii) P sl (a) ≥ 0 when Rs (a) ≥ 0
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Figure 4.1: The eﬃcient allocation of talents with search frictions. Agents whose char-
acteristics are located on the left of the participation line do not participate. Agents
whose characteristics are below the indiﬀerence line get educated. The others remain
uneducated.
Proposition 4 provides two pieces of information. First, when the mean ability among
the educated is larger than among the uneducated, the eﬃcient allocation can be depicted
by Figure 4.1.
There are two lines. The set of non-participating agents Ωse is on the left of the
participation line; the set of educated individuals Ωsh is below the (positively sloped)
indiﬀerence line; the set of uneducated participating agents Ωsl is located between the two
lines. The high-skill search market is tighter than the low-skill one, i.e. θsl < θ
s
h, the
return to ability is larger in the high-skill sector, i.e. P sh (a) ≥ P sl (a), and, finally, the
return to schooling is positively related to ability. In addition, if the return to schooling
is non-negative, then the return to ability in the low-skill sector is also non-negative.
Second, if the eﬃcient allocation is given by Figure 4.1, then asl < a
s
h. This property
is actually induced by Assumption 3, which plays here a similar role to the one played in
the decentralized economy11.
Importantly, Proposition 4 does not say which allocation is chosen by the planner.
The eﬃcient allocation may well be such that asl > a
s
h. The following result prevents such
a case to occur.
11Note, however, that Proposition 2 only requires that Assumption 3 holds for d = 0, while Proposition
4 requires that Assumption 3 holds for all d.
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Figure 4.2: Eﬃcient vs decentralized return to schooling in case (i) of Proposition 6.
Agents whose ability is lower than amin overestimate the return to schooling, while the
others underestimate it.
Proposition 5 asl < a
s
h if Ah is suﬃciently large
Hereafter, we shall assume the eﬃcient allocation is the one described by Proposition
4.
How much does the decentralized allocation diﬀer from the eﬃcient allocation? This
issue is investigated in the next sub-section.
4.3. The ineﬃciency of the decentralized outcome
We start the discussion by comparing private and social returns to schooling.
Proposition 6 Efficient vs equilibrium returns to schooling
If asl < a
s
h, one of the two following cases prevails:
(i) There exists a unique alim > 0 such that Rs (a) Q R∗ iﬀ a Q alim, or
(ii) Rs (a) < R∗ for all a ≥ 0
Figure 4.2 depicts the social return to schooling in case (i).
Unlike the social return to schooling, the private return does not depend on individual
ability. Thus, agents do not select themselves enough on the basis of ability: those
endowed with a low ability over-estimate the return to their schooling, while on the
contrary, abler individuals may underestimate their’s.
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However, high ability individuals may also face too high private returns to schooling.
This property is due to Nash bargaining, and not to skill heterogeneity. To see this,
suppose the distribution of ability is degenerate and consider the private and social returns
to schooling:
R∗ = Uh (β)− Ul (β) and Rs = Uh (1− αh)− Ul (1− αl) (4.22)
where the equilibrium dependence vis-à-vis β has been highlighted. When the Hosios
condition holds, job creation is eﬃcient in each sector; so is the private return to search
in each sector and, as a consequence, the private return to schooling equals the social
return. However, when the Hosios condition is not satisfied, the return to search in the
two sectors are generally too low, as Ui (β) < Ui (1− αi). As a consequence, the private
return to schooling is generally diﬀerent from the social return. Overeducation may then
take place whenever Uh (β)− Uh (1− αh) > Ul (β)− Ul (1− αl). For instance, this is the
case12 when β = 1− αh 6= 1− αl.
We now analyse the consequences of proposition 6 on the eﬃciency of the decentralized
allocation of talents across sectors.
Proposition 7 A characterization of over- and under-education
Let xj, j = ∗, s, be two functions defined on [0,∞) such that
xj (c) =
Z
c≤Rj(a)a
φ (a, c) da (4.23)
If asl < a
s
h, one of the two following cases prevails:
(i) There exists a unique clim ≡ R∗alim such that x∗ (c) R xs (c) iﬀ c Q clim
(ii) x∗ (c) > xs (c) for all c ≥ 0
We compare the number of educated individuals whose schooling cost is c in the
decentralized economy x∗ (c) to the number xs (c) chosen by the social planner. The
diﬀerence between these two numbers oﬀers a measure of under- or over-education at
schooling cost c. Proposition 7 shows that high schooling cost individuals always over-
educate, while under-education may occur at lower schooling costs.
12This suggests another potential channel through which Nash bargaining may translate into over-
education: sector-specific bargaining powers, of which the uneducated would typically be higher than
1 − αl. We did not consider this possibility for two reasons. First, wages are bargained individually
in the model, and not collectively. In that way, the bargaining power is more likely individual-specific
rather than sector-specific. Second, this would raise additional diﬃculties while stating the existence of
a decentralized equilibrium.
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Figure 4.3: Overeducation for the rich, undereducation for the poor. There are overedu-
cated agents at low schooling costs, while there are undereducated agents at high schooling
costs.
The situation is depicted by Figures 4.3 and 4.4, which confront the decentralized
allocation of talents to the eﬃcient one. These figures display the two following properties.
First, workers endowed with a very low ability are excluded from the labour market in the
eﬃcient allocation, while they are not in the decentralized case. Second, over-education
prevails among the low schooling cost workers — the rich. This is a consequence of the
minimum skill requirement in the eﬃcient allocation.
In Figure 4.3, the slope of the social diﬀerential return to ability is higher than the slope
of the private one. This implies under-education for high schooling cost individuals — the
poor. Over-education among the rich and under-education among the poor explain why
the slope of the diﬀerential return to ability is larger in the eﬃcient economy. On the one
hand, the poorly talented but rich individuals who get an education deteriorate the mean
ability among the educated. This in turn reduces search prospects in the high-skill sector.
On the other hand, highly talented but poor individuals who stay uneducated improve
the mean ability among the uneducated. This raises wage and employment opportunities
in the low-skill sector. Both eﬀects lower the diﬀerential return to ability.
In Figure 4.4, the slope of the diﬀerential return to ability is higher in the eﬃcient
allocation than in the decentralized allocation. This implies over-education at all school-
ing costs. As suggested above, this situation occurs because workers’ bargaining power
generally fails to internalize search externalities.
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Figure 4.4: Overeducation for all. There are overeducated agents at all schooling costs.
5. Education policy
In this section, we study the optimal education policy — the policy maximizing aggregate
welfare — in the case where ability is not observable, whereas schooling costs are. The
education policy consists of two instruments: a lump-sum fee granted to all individuals
willing to educate, and a subsidy proportional to their schooling costs. In addition, we
focus on the case where the Hosios condition is met, and show that on average education
should be taxed more than it should be subsidized.
Specific assumptions. We investigate the possibility to alter the decentralized outcome
through taxes and subsidies, so as to replicate the eﬃcient allocation. For this question
to make sense, we consider the realistic environment in which the planner cannot observe
individual ability, while the schooling cost is observable: in several papers (see among
others Heckman, 2000, Cameron and Heckman, 2001, Carneiro and Heckman, 2001), it is
argued that children’s scholastic ability is strongly correlated to parental income. From
this perspective, the individual schooling cost is observable as far as parents’ income is
observable.
To simplify, we also assume the social planner does not address the market failure
originating from the participation of very low ability agents to the low-skill sector. This
can be so either because the minimum of the support of the skill distribution is larger
than the (socially) optimal minimum ability required to participate to the low-skill sector,
or because there are huge costs associated to the exclusion of a fraction of the population
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from all economic activities — at least higher than the gain induced by the nonparticipation
of the least able.
Decentralizing the first best allocation. The planner has two sets of policy instruments.
First, ti, i = h, l, is the sector-specific tax rate on output. Second, τ is the proportion
of private schooling cost financed by the State, while c is a lump-sum tuition fee on
education. Hence, the actual cost of schooling is worth (1− τ) (c+ c).13
Proposition 8 First best in the decentralized economy
Assume ash > a
s
l and let αi ≡ α (θsi ), i = h, l. The eﬃcient allocation is decentralized iﬀ
(i) 1− ti = αi1−β
ui+β(1−ui)
ui+(1−αi)(1−ui) , i = h, l
(ii) c = αh
1−αhuhP
s
h (a
s
h) a
s
h − αl1−αlulP
s
l (a
s
l ) a
s
l > 0
(iii) 1− τ = β
1−β
αh
1−αh
P sh(ash)−
αl
1−αl
P sl (asl )
(1−uh)Ah/δ−(1−ul)Al/δ > 0
Sector-specific taxes on output allow to internalize search externalities, and compen-
sate inadequate bargaining powers. Hence, the tax rate is positive if and only if β < 1−αi,
it is nil when β = 1 − αl = 1 − αh, and it is negative otherwise. The lump-sum tuition
cost is equal to the social diﬀerential cost of participation to each sector; it deters the low
ability agents with small schooling costs to invest in education. Finally, the proportion of
schooling costs financed by the State τ is smaller than 1.
When the Hosios condition is met. The study of the optimal schooling policy when
the Hosios condition is met is particularly illuminating. We now assume β = 1 − αsl =
1− αsh = 1− α. To understand the optimal policy in this case, consider Figure 4.3. This
figure depicts the eﬃcient and decentralized allocations that would result if asi = a
∗
i . To
make both allocations coincide, it is necessary to shift the decentralized indiﬀerence line
by means of a clockwise rotation to the left. This can be reached by mean of a schooling
fee, deterring the low ability and low schooling costs individuals to become educated, and
a voucher increasing in schooling cost to attract abler workers with large schooling costs
on the high-skill market14. Hence,
c =
α
1− α [uhP
s
h (a
s
h) a
s
h − ulP sl (asl ) asl ] (5.1)
1− τ = P
s
h (a
s
h)− P sl (asl )
(1− uh)Ah/δ − (1− ul)Al/δ
(5.2)
13The proceed of all taxes is redistributed through equal and non-distorsive lump-sum transfers. If
negative, we assume all agents are endowed with enough wealth to finance the lump-sum tax.
14Note that the optimal policy described here diﬀers from what would result with credit market im-
perfections. In that latter case, income redistribution is a primary goal of education policy to decrease
the aggregate schooling cost.
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The education policy is redistributive: low schooling cost individuals are taxed, while
high-schooling costs individuals are subsidized.. This raises the following question: On
average, should education be taxed more than it should be subsidized? Formally, each
individual pays an additional (1− τ) c, but gets τc back. Hence, τc − (1− τ) c is the
voucher received by such an individual, and ∆ =
R R
Ωsh
[τc− (1− τ) c]φ (a, c) dadc is the
net subsidy to education.
Proposition 9 The optimal policy under the Hosios condition
Let β = 1− αh = 1− αl = 1− α. Then,
∆ =
Z Z
Ωsh
[τc− (1− τ) c]φ (a, c) dadc < 0 (5.3)
Hence, the optimal policy is to make individuals pay more on average than they would
pay in the laissez-faire economy. This result generalizes Charlot and Decreuse (2005).
When agents have the same schooling cost, they do not self-select enough on the basis
of ability. The optimal education policy is to set a tax on education to deter too low
ability agents from entering the educated sector. This result survives the consideration
of schooling cost heterogeneity and the need to subsidize the education of high schooling
cost and high ability individuals.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬃciency of educational choices in a two sector/two schooling level
matching model of the labour market where a continuum of heterogenous workers allocates
itself between sectors depending on their decision to invest in education. Individuals
diﬀer in ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and
there is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education originates
composition eﬀects in the distribution of skills across sectors, as the distribution of ability
among those who get an education diﬀers from the distribution of ability in the whole
population. This in turn modifies the intensity of job creation, implying the private and
social returns to schooling always diﬀer. Provided that ability and schooling cost are not
too positively correlated, agents with large schooling costs — the ‘poor’ — select themselves
too much, while there is too little self-selection among the low schooling cost individuals
— the ‘rich’. Eﬃciency can be restored by a combination of education and labour market
policy involving three instruments: first, a sector-specific tax on output to compensate
inadequate bargaining power; second, a lump-sum tuition cost to deter the low ability-
low schooling cost from schooling; third, a subsidy increasing in private schooling costs
to encourage more talented individuals with large schooling costs to get an education. In
24
addition, we show that education must be more taxed than subsidized in the case where
the Hosios condition holds.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs
Proof of proposition 1 In text.
Proof of proposition 2 We proceed in five steps. We start by the free entry equations
(4.6) determining sector-specific tightnesses.
Step 1. (i) At given ai > 0, there exists a unique θi ≡ Θi (ai) solving (4.6), i = h, l.
(ii) Θi is strictly increasing, with lim
a→0
Θi (a) = 0 and lim
a→∞
Θi (a) =∞.
(iii) Θh (ah) > Θl (al) iﬀ Ahah > Alal
Proof. (i) Existence and uniqueness follow from Assumption 3. Claim (ii) results
from the implicit function theorem, the fact the matching function satisfies the
Inada conditions, and from its boundary properties. Claim (iii) follows directly
from equations (4.6), i = h, l.
We now consider the schooling return, rewritten here for convenience:
R ≡ < (θl, θh) = βµ (θh)δ + βµ (θh)
Ah
δ
− βµ (θl)
δ + βµ (θl)
Al
δ
(A.1)
Step 2. (i) The function < is strictly decreasing in θl and strictly increasing in θh
(ii) < (θl, θh) ∈ [−Al/δ, Ah/δ]
(iii) < (θl, θh) > 0 if θh ≥ θl
Proof. (i) follows from the fact that the function µ is strictly increasing in θi. Claim
(ii) results from the boundary properties of the function µ. Claim (iii) is induced
by Ah > Al.
Step 3. An interior equilibrium solves
a∗l = E [a | c > < (Θl (a∗l ) ,Θh (a∗h)) a] (A.2)
a∗h = E [a | c ≤ < (Θl (a∗l ) ,Θh (a∗h)) a] (A.3)
with θ∗i = Θi (a
∗
i ), i = h, l, and < (Θl (a∗l ) ,Θh (a∗h)) > 0
Proof. This is implied by definition 1, step 1 and step 2.
We now proceed to solve the fixed point problem stated by equation (A.2) and
(A.3). To this aim, let us define the function Ψ : R+ × R+ → R+ × R+ such that
Ψ (al, ah) = (Ψh (al, ah) ,Ψl (al, ah)), where
Ψl (al, ah) = E [a | c > < (Θl (al) ,Θh (ah)) a] (A.4)
Ψh (al, ah) = E [a | c ≤ < (Θl (al) ,Θh (ah)) a] (A.5)
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Step 4. Let amax = max
R∈[0,Ah/δ]
E [a | c ≤ Ra] and Λ = [0,E (a)]× [E (a) , amax]. Under
Assumption 3, Ψ (Λ) ⊂ Λ
Proof. Take any pair (al, ah) ∈ Λ. As ah ≥ al, step 1 implies Θh (ah) > Θl (al).
Then, < (Θl (al) ,Θh (ah)) > 0 from step 2. Assumption 3 and the definition of amax
imply
amax ≥ E [a | c ≤ < (Θl (al) ,Θh (ah)) a] > E (a) (A.6)
But, for all b > 0,
xhE [a | c ≤ ba] + (1− xh)E [a | c > ba] = E (a) (A.7)
where
xh =
Z
a
Z
c≤ba
φ (a, c) dcda < 1 (A.8)
Therefore, Assumption 3 also implies
0 < E [a | c > < (Θl (al) ,Θh (ah)) a] < E (a) (A.9)
It follows from inequalities (A.6) and (A.9) that Ψ (al, ah) ∈ Λ, which establishes
the claim.
Step 5. (conclusion) There exists an interior equilibrium with a∗l < E (a) < a∗h
Proof. The set Λ is compact and the function Ψ is continuous. From the fixed-
point theorem, there exists (a∗l , a
∗
h) ∈ Λ such that (a∗l , a∗h) = Ψ (a∗l , a∗h). To close the
proof, note that inequalities (A.6) and (A.9) hold for all (al, ah) ∈ Λ. Therefore,
a∗l < E (a) < a∗h.
Proof of proposition 3 We derive rigorously the planner’s commands. Let p (a, c) be
the proportion among workers of ability a and schooling cost c — (a, c)-workers —
who participate to either one of the two search markets. Let also πi (a, c) be the
proportion of (a, c)-workers aﬀected to the subset Ωi. The planner’s objective writes
S = max
p,πi,θi
*Z
a
Z
c
p (a, c)φ (a, c)
(X
i
πi (a, c)Pi (a)− πh (a, c) c
)
dcda
+
(A.10)
where Pi (a) is given by (4.12). The maximization problem is subject to ui =
µ (θi) / (δ + µ (θi)), i = h, l, p (a, c) ∈ [0, 1] and πl (a, c) = 1− πh (a, c) ∈ [0, 1].
For all (a, c) ∈ Ω, the first-order conditions write down
ps (a, c) = 1⇔
X
i
πsi (a, c)P
s
i (a) a− πsh (a, c) c ≥ 0 (A.11)
πs (a, c) = 1⇔ Rs (a) a = [P sh (a)− P sl (a)] a ≥ c (A.12)
γ
η (θsi )
= α (θsi )
Aiasi
δ + µ (θsi )
, i = h, l (A.13)
27
with
asi =
R
a
R
c φ (a, c)π
s
i (a, c) p
s (a, c) adadcR
a
R
c φ (a, c)π
s
i (a, c) ps (a, c) dadc
(A.14)
Note that we impose ps (a, c) = 1 when (A.11) holds with equality. Similarly,
πsh (a, c) = 1 when R
s (a) a = c. We can do so as the joint distribution over a and c
has no mass point by assumption.
Proof of proposition 4 We first prove the conditions are necessary, and then that they
are suﬃcient.
Step 1. The ‘only if’ part of the proof.
Assume ash > a
s
l .
(i) Note first that
dRs (a) /da > 0 iﬀ (1− ush)
γ
ηsh
> (1− usl )
γ
ηsl
(A.15)
d (Rs (a) a) /da > 0 iﬀ (1− ush)Ah > (1− usl )Al (A.16)
It follows from (A.13) and ash > a
s
l that θ
s
h > θ
s
l . In turn, this implies u
s
h < u
s
l and
γ/η (θsh) > γ/η (θ
s
l ). Hence (i) is true.
(ii) Assume P sl (a) < 0. This implies a <
δ
Al
γ
ηsl
≡ a0. Since Rs is strictly increasing,
Rs (a) < Rs (a0) = (1− ush)
∙
Ah
δ
− Al
δ
γ/ηsh
γ/ηsl
¸
(A.17)
But ash > a
s
l implies Alγ/η
s
h > Ahγ/η
s
l . It follows R
s (a) < 0, and (ii) holds.
Step 2. The ‘if’ part of the proof.
(i) and (ii) characterize the allocation depicted by Figure 4.1. We have to show this
allocation implies ash > a
s
l . But,
asl = E [a | c > Rs (a) , a ≥ a0] (A.18)
ash = E [a | c ≤ Rs (a)] = E [a | c ≤ Rs (a) , a ≥ a0] (A.19)
For a reason similar to the one exposed in Step 4 of the proof of proposition 2,
Assumption 3 implies
E [a | c > Rs (a) , a ≥ a0] < E [a | a ≥ a0] < E [a | c ≤ Rs (a) , a ≥ a0] (A.20)
This closes the proof.
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Proof of proposition 5 Let Θi (a) ≡ Θ (β,Aia) and ui ≡ δ/ (δ + µ (Θ (β,Aiai))) to
highlight the dependence vis-à-vis β and Ai. The function Θ is strictly increasing in
its second argument from 0 to infinity. Therefore, (1− ui)Ai and (1− ui) γ/η (Θ (β,Aia))
go from 0 to infinity with Ai provided ai > 0. Hence as far as ash > 0, R
s (a) and
Rs (a) a are both strictly increasing in a provided Ah is suﬃciently large. In addi-
tion, Rs (a0) > 0 if Ah is suﬃciently large. Thus, Rs (a) ≥ 0 implies P sl (a) ≥ 0.
From Proposition 4, ash > a
s
l . Now, we have to prove a
s
h = 0 cannot be a solution to
the maximization program. The (marginal) contribution of workers whose ability is
close to a0 and schooling cost close to 0 is worth φ (a0)P sh (a0) a0 > 0 if assigned to
the pool of educated workers. This closes the proof.
Proof of proposition 6 We know from Proposition 4 that Rs is strictly increasing in
a. Therefore, we simply have to show that Rs (0) < 0. As (1− uh) γ/η (θh) >
(1− ul) γ/η (θl), we have lim
a→0
Rs (a) = −∞.
Proof of proposition 7 The result is obvious from Figures 4.3 and 4.4. At given school-
ing cost c, there is over-education since the decentralized indiﬀerence line is below
the eﬃcient one. If Rs (a) < R∗ for all a ≥ 0, the two curves never cross and (ii)
holds. If Rs (a) ≥ R∗ for all a ≥ alim, the two curves intersect in (alim, clim). (i)
follows.
Proof of proposition 8 The policy is obtained by making the centralized and decen-
tralized allocations coincide.
Proof of proposition 9 In the remaining of the proof, let us denote Pi ≡ P si (asi ). If
β = 1− αi, i = h, l, then ti = 0 and (5.1) and (5.2) hold. Hence,
1− τ
τ
c =
Ph − Pl
uhPh − ulPl
[uhPhah − ulPlal]
> [Ph − Pl] ah ≡ Rs (ah) ah
Therefore,
∆ < τ
Z Z
Ωsh
[c−Rs (ah) ah]φ (a, c) dadc
From the f.o.c, (a, c) ∈ Ωsh iﬀ
c ≤ Rs (a) a = (Ph − Pl) a+
α
1− α [uhPh (a− ah)− ulPl (a− al)]
Integrating over Ωsh both sides of the inequality yieldsZ Z
Ωsh
cφ (a, c) dcda <
Z Z
Ωsh
(Ph − Pl) aφ (a, c) dcda−
Z Z
Ωsh
α
1− αulPl (a− al)φ (a, c) dcda
The result follows.
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